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Abstract—The Internet of Things and specifically the Tactile
Internet give rise to significant challenges for notions of security.
In this work, we introduce a novel concept for secure massive
access. The core of our approach is a fast and low-complexity
blind deconvolution algorithm exploring a bi-linear and hier-
archical compressed sensing framework. We show that blind
deconvolution has two appealing features: 1) There is no need to
coordinate the pilot signals, so even in the case of collisions in user
activity, the information messages can be resolved. 2) Since all
the individual channels are recovered in parallel, and by assumed
channel reciprocity, the measured channel entropy serves as a
common secret and is used as an encryption key for each user.
We will outline the basic concepts underlying the approach and
describe the blind deconvolution algorithm in detail. Eventually,
simulations demonstrate the ability of the algorithm to recover
both channel and message. They also exhibit the inherent trade-
offs of the scheme between economical recovery and secret
capacity.
Keywords—5G, massive IoT, physical layer security, blind
deconvolution, compressed sensing, hierarchical sparsity
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, major developments in communica-
tion technologies have radically altered the way we communi-
cate. This entails difficult network challenges from the techno-
logical side. As the sheer volume of data being transmitted is
growing, these challenges are concomitant with new demands
on the security of the communication channels. To accompany
the significant challenges of security of communication in
the realm of big data, novel physical layers of security will
have to be identified and developed. This seems particularly
relevant in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT) and
the Tactile Internet (TI). In this work we will show that
sparse signal processing can be incorporated naturally within
the concept of massive IoT, including the TI and embedded
security. We go on to demonstrate that it indeed exhibits a
new degree of freedom in the design of (low-complexity)
algorithms, naturally entailing new interesting trade-offs such
as compressibility versus secrecy [1], [2].
Our specific innovations are as follows: We propose a fast,
scalable, and secure access procedure with low complexity
[1], [2]. At the heart of our approach is a new fast blind
deconvolution algorithm based on bilinear compressed sensing
(CS) and hierarchical sparsity frameworks [3], [4], [5], [6]. The
proposed algorithm has the additional advantageous feature of
being inherent to low-complexity by avoiding semi-definite
programming techniques. Using blind deconvolution for the
uncoordinated massive access has two appealing features:
i) There is no need to coordinate the pilot signals, so even in
case of collisions user activity and information messages
can be resolved.
ii) Since all the individual channels can be recovered in par-
allel, and by assumed channel reciprocity, the measured
channel entropy serves as a common secret and is used
as an encryption key for each user [7].
In this work, we will outline the underlying basic concepts, and
describe the proposed blind deconvolution algorithm in detail.
Eventually, simulations demonstrate the (not at all obvious)
ability of the algorithm to recover both channel and message,
and also nicely reveal the inherent trade-offs. If a channel
is sparser, the recovery is improved but at the same time
less entropy for key generation is available. Hence, while
the recovery can be achieved more economically, the secrecy
properties are degraded.
Basic notations
• The circular convolution of two vectors f, g ∈ Cn will
be denoted by f ~ g and is defined as
(f ~ g)j :=
n∑
i=1
fjg(i−j+1)modn. (1)
• ‖·‖ will denote either the `2-norm of a vector or the
Frobenius-norm of a matrix depending on the context.
• For a set S let |S| denote its cardinality. For any positive
N ∈ N we define [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N}.
• For a vector x ∈ Cn we denote by | · |0 the function that
returns the number of non-zero elements of x, i.e.
|x|0 := |{i ∈ [n] : xi 6= 0}|. (2)
• The transpose/Hermitian of a matrix A with complex
entries will be denoted AT and AH , respectively.
• The Kronecker product of the matrices A ∈ CM×N and
B ∈ CO×P is denoted by A ⊗ B and is defined as the
CMO×NP block matrix
A⊗B :=

a1,1B a1,2B . . . a1,NB
a2,1B
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . aM−1,NB
aM,1B . . . aM,N−1B aM,NB
 ,
(3)
where ai,j is the (i, j)-entry of A.
• The map vec : CM×N → CMN is the column-wise
vectorization of a matrix, i.e. it stacks the columns of
a matrix into a long vector.
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2• circ(v) denotes the circulant matrix of a vector v ∈ Cn,
which is defined as
circ(v) :=

v1 vn−1 . . . v3 v2
v2 v1 vn−1 v3
... v2 v1
. . .
...
vn−2
. . . . . . vn−1
vn−1 vn−2 . . . v2 v1
 . (4)
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secure random access scenario where ac-
cess point “Alice” with Nt antennas communicates with Nr
“Bobs”, which are low-complexity devices, equipped with
a single antenna each. Furthermore, we assume an OFDM
signal model, so that essentially all wireless channel oper-
ations become cyclic, acting by the circ(·) operation. The
communication is bi-directional and TDD in T ≥ 1 time slots
t0, t1, . . . , tT−1 in the following fashion:
• First, Alice sends out multiple beacon OFDM symbols so
that the Bobs can synchronize and measure the channels
to each of Alice’s antennas. From the measured channels
each Bob generates a key and encrypts its message.
• Subsequently all Bobs transmit in an uncoordinated fash-
ion their encrypted messages in the same slot while no
pilot signaling is used. Alice uses a blind deconvolution
algorithm to simultaneously estimate the channels and
the signals “in one shot”.
A. Wireless channel properties
The most important random entity is the wireless channel
from Alice to all the Bobs and from the Bobs to Alice per
antenna. We use the following convention for the bi-directional
communication: p is the index of the transmitting antenna, q
of the receiving antenna, and i represents the delay domain
in some time slot. Hence, the matrix Ha→bp = (h
a→b
p,q,i) that
represents the wireless channels from Alice’s p-th antenna to
all Bobs is given by
Ha→bp =

... ha→bp,q,1
...
ha→bp,1,i . . .
... . . . ha→bp,Nr,i
... ha→bp,q,Nd
...
 ∈ CNd×Nr
(5)
for p = 1, . . . , Nt. In addition, the matrices Hb→ap = (h
b→a
pqi )
representing the wireless channels from pth Bob to Alice are
given by
Hb→ap =

... hb→ap,q,1
...
hb→ap,1,i . . .
... . . . hb→ap,Nt,i
... hb→ap,q,Nd
...
 ∈ CNd×Nt
(6)
for p = 1, . . . , Nr. Notably, we impose a typical structural
assumption for wireless channels: Each column vector hp,q =
(hp,q,i) contains only Nd  N coefficients, where Nd is
called delay spread of the Channel Impulse Response (CIR)
of any p-th/q-th pair that gets transmitted/received. This is a
common assumption, e.g. for OFDM systems.
Now, the received time-space signal (represented by rows
and columns, respectively) in some time slot for Alice is given
by Y a (ti) ∈ CN×Nt and for all the Bobs by Y b (ti) ∈
CN×Nr , where N  1 is the signal space dimension and Nt
and Nr are the numbers of antennas that transmit and receive.
We assume that the channel coherence time is essentially larger
than the slot time and shall henceforth drop the dependency on
the time slot to ease the notation. On each transmit antenna
p with 1 ≤ p ≤ Nt, both some known and some unknown
transmitted sequences sa/bp , x
a/b
p ∈ CN are broadcast. The
signals for Alice and Bob in one time slot then become
Alice→ Bob: Y b =
Nt∑
p=1
(
Sap +X
a
p
)
Ha→bp + Z
b, (7a)
Alice← Bob: Y a =
Nr∑
p=1
(
Sbp +X
b
p
)
Hb→ap + Z
a. (7b)
Here, Sa/bp = circ(s
a/b
p ), Xp = circ(x
a/b
p ) ∈ CN×Nd are the
circulant matrices of the transmitted sequences as defined in
(4). The matrices Za/b denote additive white Gaussian noise
with variance η2. We will impose the following structural
properties:
• Reciprocity property: If not stated otherwise, we assume
the reciprocity property, i.e., if we change the roles of
the transmitting antenna p and the receiving antenna
q, the channel coefficients are conjugate complex, i.e.,
ha→bp,q,i =
(
hb→aq,p,i
)∗
. Note that this assumption is by far not
unrealistic today, as it is already possible to verify with
off-the-shelf WiFi devices [8].
• Natural structural properties: We assume that out of the
Nd channel coefficients, in each column of Ha→bp , H
b→a
p
only σ > 0 of the CIR coefficients are actually non-zero
and the exact positions of the coefficients within Hp are
unknown, i.e., the channel is σ-sparse (in the canonical
base).
• Imposed structural properties: Our final structural as-
sumption is that the unknown signals xp are s-sparse by
design in some known subspaces with bases Q1, Q2, . . .
such that xp = Qpbp, where bp is a binary vector with
|b|0 = s. The rate delivered by this approach is
R =
1
N
log2
(
N
s
)
[bits].
In the sequel, we will propose an algorithm that is able
to exploit these structural assumptions to recover both the
unknown channels and the unknown signals, given only the
superposition of their convolutions.
B. Inherent security of the scheme
We briefly describe the information theoretic secrecy stem-
ming from the envisioned scheme. It builds on the reciprocity
property of the channel and exploits randomness of the channel
gain1 to generate a key and encrypt the message. We refer to
1Which is due to fading in the wireless channel.
3the work [9] for an in-depth analysis regarding the use of
channel gains for keys, as that was the first rigorous work on
the subject.
Phase 1:
• Alice sends a predefined pilot signal to all Bobs.
• Each Bob q can measure the complex-valued channel
gains Ha→bp,q,i = h
b→a
q,p,i ∀p, i.
• Each Bob encrypts his message m with c =
f(m, {ha→bp,q,i}), effectively using the channel as a source
of randomness for key generation.
Phase 2
• All the Bobs p send their encrypted cipher texts cp to
Alice in an uncoordinated way.
• Alice receives the superposition of all the convolutions of
the cipher text with the respective channels. Now she has
a blind de-mixing/de-convolution problem and receives
the cipher-texts and complex-valued channel gain pairs
(Hb→ap , cp) = (H
a→b
p , cp) ∀p, q, i of every Bob by using
our algorithm.
• Since Alice knows Hb→ap , which is the same as H
a→b
p
due to reciprocity, she can generate the key herself and
decrypt the cipher-texts.
We note that small variations between both channels, i.e.
small violations of reciprocity do not matter, since we can
adjust the key generation process. One can for example
quantize the channel gain coarse enough to equalize the keys.
This would lower the achievable key rate, but would not impact
the security of the scheme, due to the assumed independence
between the channel gains from Alice to Eve and Alice to Bob.
However, a detailed analysis shall be carried out in follow-up
work.
III. FORMULATION AS BLIND DE-CONVOLUTION PROBLEM
A. Single user case
For the purpose of exposition, we first consider the case of
a single user and a single antenna. Bob sends the signal xb
over the channel hb→a to Alice, who receives
ya = hb→a ~ xb = circ(xb)hb→a. (8)
Using the so-called lifting trick, which was introduced in the
context of phase retrieval [10], [11] and later generalized to
blind deconvolution problems [12], this bi-linear equation can
be transformed into a linear one as
ya = B vec
(
xb(hb→a)T
)
+ za. (9)
Here, B is a suitable matrix with (B)i,(j,k) = δi,j+kmodN
((j, k) is a double index notation), which is composed as
B =

10...0 0...01 0...10 ... 01...0
01...0 10...0 0...01 ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
 ∈ (0, 1)N×N2 ,
(10)
and za is a Gaussian noise vector. The sparse signal model
xb = Qbb with the random coding matrix Q ∈ CN×E and
s-sparse binary vector ba ∈ {−1, 1}E of length E can be
incorporated in the formulation to yield
ya = B(INd ⊗Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:M
vec(bb(hb→a)T ). (11)
By this procedure, the blind deconvolution problem of recov-
ering hb→a and xb from the measurement ya is turned into a
matrix recovery problem in X = bb(hb→a)T , given the linear
measurement operator A : CNd×E → CN , defined by (11).
The factors hb→a and bb can be obtained from X as the first
left and right singular vectors of the SVD of X .
B. Multi-user case
In the more general case of multiple Bobs, each of Alice’s
antennas receives a superposition of signals, each convolved
with its respective channel,
yq =
Nr∑
p=1
hp,q ~Qpbp + zq for q = 1, . . . , Nt, (12)
where we have dropped the superscripts indicating the sender
and receiver to simplify the notation. The lifting trick can be
applied to each summand, resulting in
yq =
Nr∑
p=1
B(INd ⊗Qp) vec(bphTp,q) + zq. (13)
In comparison to (11), this is a (more challenging) problem of
simultaneous blind deconvolution and blind de-mixing. Work
on this problem has been done in ref. [13]. Problem (13) can
be brought into the form
yq =M vec(Xq) + zq for q = 1, . . . , Nt, (14)
with the big system matrix
M = B
 INd ⊗Q1...
INd ⊗QNr

T
∈ CN×Nd·E·Nr , (15)
and the unknown Xq = [X1,qX2,q . . . XNr,q] with Xp,q =
bph
T
p,q . With the structural assumptions that each channel hq
is σ-sparse, each bq is s-sparse and only µ of the Nr users
are active at a time, the vectorization vec(Xq) ∈ CNd·E·Nr
becomes a hierarchically (s, σ, µ)-sparse vector. The final
equation for the multi-user, multi-antenna setup is then
yT1
...
yTq
...
yTNt

T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Y ∈CN×Nt
= B
 INd ⊗Q1...
INd ⊗QNr

T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M∈CN×Nd·E·Nr
·

vec(X1)
T
...
vec(Xq)
T
...
vec(XNt)
T

T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=X∈CNd·E·Nr×Nt
. (16)
It is worth noting that the columns of X are jointly sparse,
since the antennas are close to each other, and hence for each
p, the channels hp,q have the same support for all q.
4IV. FAST BLIND DE-CONVOLUTION ALGORITHM
A. Prior work
There exists a number of recent works on solution strategies
for the blind deconvolution problem and the extended blind
deconvolution and blind de-mixing problem using the different
approaches. Convex approaches use the formulation
min
X
ϕ(X) s.t. A(X) = y, (17)
where X is the unknown matrix variable, A is the linear
measurement operator and y the given data. The objective
function ϕ(·) is used to incorporate structural assumptions
on X that can be exploited to find a unique solution to the
under-determined system A(X) = y. In ref. [12], the nuclear
norm ϕ(X) = ‖X‖∗ is used, exploiting the fact that X as
an outer product of b and h is a rank one matrix. Instead of
sparsity priors for b and h, in ref. [12] the authors assume that
both vectors are in known low-dimensional subspaces. This
setting was generalized to include the de-mixing of multiple
convolutions in ref. [13], [14].
To relax the subspace assumption to sparse vectors, it seems
natural to linearly combine the regularizers promoting low-
rankness and sparsity of the matrix, i.e. ϕ(X) = ‖X‖∗ +
λ ‖X‖1. But in fact one can show that the linear combination
does not yield an improved sampling complexity, compared to
just using one of the regularizers [15]. Furthermore, convex
formulations including the nuclear norm are semidefinite pro-
grams and can be solved by popular interior-point solvers such
as SDPT3 [16] or SeDuMi [17]. These SDP-solvers have the
drawback of being prohibitively slow and memory consuming
for large scale problems, as their computational and storage
complexity typically scales cubically in the system size.
For this reason, subsequent convex approaches focused on
exploiting the sparsity of X and structured versions thereof.
Ling and Strohmer minimize ϕ(X) = ‖X‖1 assuming that at
least one of the factors h, b is sparse and hence also X . In
this setting the sparsity of X is structured since each column
is either vanishing or dense. This block-sparse structure mo-
tivated the use of the objective function is ϕ(X) = ‖X‖1,2,
which is defined as the sum of the column norms of X , in ref.
[18]. The current work follows in this line of research, further
incorporating the sparsity structures inherent to the problem,
if both vectors h and b are assumed to be sparse.
Following a different approach, a number of non-convex
algorithms, mostly based on alternating minimization, exist
that deal with blind-deconvolution and related problems. For
example, the blind deconvolution and blind de-mixing prob-
lem, where low-dimensional subspaces for both vectors are
known, is tackled in [19], [20] and the sparse setting is handled
in [21]. For these to work properly, a good initial guess for
the unknown factors of X is crucial. Therefore, in [19] a basin
of attraction is constructed, and a spectral method is used to
obtain an initialization close to the solution. The algorithm of
[21] uses a hard thresholding algorithm to compute a suffi-
ciently close initial guess and only then proceeds with their
alternating minimization algorithm. This algorithm, however,
involves the projection onto a complicated, non-convex set
whose success can not be guaranteed.
B. Proposed algorithm
Motivated by the application in mMTC, the recovery of
hierarchical sparse signals from linear measurements was
studied in ref. [4]. In this work, the HiHTP algorithm was
extended to solve the outlined 3-dimensional problem
min
z∈CNd·E·Nr
1
2
‖y −Mz‖2 s.t. z is hierarchically (s, σ, µ)-sparse.
(18)
A hierarchically sparse vector z ∈ CNd·E·Nr has the following
structure.
z = (z1, z2, . . . zr︷ ︸︸ ︷
(zr1 , z
r
2 , . . . , z
r
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
(zr1,j , z
r
2,j , . . . , z
r
i,j , . . . , z
r
D,j)
, . . . , zrE)
, . . . , zNr )T (19)
As described above, only µ of the vectors zr are different
from zero, or “active”. The active vectors only have σ non-
zero blocks, and each of these blocks is s-sparse.
HiHTP tries to find such a structured solution to (18) by
repeating the following steps:
i) Perform one gradient step on the current iterate z(k).
ii) Determine the support S(k+1) of the next iterate via
hierarchical hard thresholding.
iii) Solve a least squares problem on S(k+1) to obtain the
new iterate z(k+1).
The details of each step are explained below.
Gradient step: The gradient of the objective function
from (18) at z(k) is given by MT (Mz(k) − y). Hence, the
intermediate point is given by
z˜(k+1) = z(k) +MT (y −Mz(k)). (20)
Hierarchical hard thresholding: In this step, the support of
the next iterate is found by thresholding the intermediate point
defined in (20) with the algorithm explained below. Define the
hard thresholding operator Ts : Cn → [n]s applied to a vector
g ∈ Cn as
Ts(g) = argmax
{i1,...,is}⊂[n]
s∑
k=1
|gik |. (21)
The hierarchical hard thresholding operator with three layers,
denoted by T(s,σ,µ), is given by the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Support via hierarchical hard thresholding
Require: Structured vector g ∈ CD·E·Nr as above, sparsity
(s, σ, µ)
for k = 1, . . . , Nr do
for j = 1, . . . , E do
Ikj = Ts(grj )
vkj =
∑
i∈Ij
|gkij |
end for
Jk = Tσ(vk)
uk =
∑
j∈Jk
vkj
end for
K = Tµ(u)
S = ⋃
k∈K
⋃
j∈Jk
Ikj
Ensure: (s, σ, µ)-sparse support set S
5Hence, the support in step k + 1 is computed as
S(k+1) = T(s,σ,µ)(z(k+1)) (22)
Least-squares problem The entries of the next iterate z(k+1)
are then computed by solving a least squares problem with
support constraints, i.e.
z(k+1) = argmin
z∈CNdENr
{
‖y −Mz‖ s.t. supp(z) ⊆ S(k+1)
}
.
(23)
The algorithm is stopped, if S(k+1) = S(k) or the maximum
number of iterations is reached. The whole algorithm is
summarized below.
Algorithm 2 HiHTP - multi-user case
Require: Measurement matrix M ; data y; channel- , signal-
and user-sparsities s, σ, µ
Set z(0) = 0, k = 0
repeat
Compute support via hierarchical hard thresholding:
S(k+1) = Ts,σ,µ
(
z(k) +MH(y −Mz(k)))
Compute the corresponding entries by solving the least-
squares problem:
z(k+1) = argmin
z∈CNdENr
{‖y −Mz‖ s.t. supp(z) ⊆ S(k+1)}
and set k = k + 1
until stopping criterion is met
Ensure: Hierarchical sparse solution z∗
V. SIMULATIONS
To test the efficiency of the HiHTP-algorithm in the mul-
tiuser setting, the following tests were conducted: We assume
for simplicity that Alice only consists of one antenna and that
there are Nr Bobs, from which only µ < Nr are active. The
multi-antenna setting will offer further possibilities to improve
the performance, since the correlations between the antennas
will introduce more structure into the model. The completion
of this model and the design of an efficient algorithm for it is
currently investigated by the authors. For each of the Nr users
a σ-sparse channel hk ∈ RNd was drawn with the locations
of the non-zeros distributed uniformly and entries drawn from
the standard normal distribution. The signals were computed
as xk = Qkbk were Q ∈ RN×E is a random matrix with
entries Qi,j ∼ N (0, 1) and b ∈ RE is s-sparse with values in
{−1, 1} if the user is active, and 0 if the user is not active.
This results in the data y ∈ RN ,
y =
Nr∑
k=1
hk ~Qkbk. (24)
The measurement matrix M ∈ R×Nd·E·Nr is such that
y =M vec(X), (25)
with X = [b1hT1 . . . bNrh
T
Nr
]. The experiments were con-
ducted with N = 1024, Nd = E = 128 and Nr = 10.
The number of active users varied from 2 to 5 and the
sparsity levels of h and b varied from 2 to 15. An experiment
was classified successful, if the support of X was recovered
correctly and the residual was below 10−6. The graphics below
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Fig. 1. Recovery rate for 2 of 10 active users
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
s
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Fig. 2. Recovery rate for 3 of 10 active users
show the rate of successful recovery for varying number of
active users, averaged over 20 runs per setup. The x- and y-
axis show the channel sparsity µ and the signal sparsity s,
respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a new access scheme for IoT applications
in which many low complexity devices spontaneously send
data to a base station in an uncoordinated fashion and included
a physical layer security scheme. The base station is able to
recover the signals as well as the channels by employing a
fast, scalable blind deconvolution algorithm called HiHTP.
The benefit of this novel approach is that it requires no
pilot signaling to measure the channels, thus greatly reducing
the overhead. This is crucial for next generation wireless
communication, where the number of devices will increase
dramatically. We have provided numerical experiments that
show the feasibility of our approach and illustrate the trade-off
between the number of active users, the required sparsity of the
signals and the channel sparsity. The adaptation of our HiHTP
algorithm to the multi-user, multi-antenna case, its robustness
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Fig. 3. Recovery rate for 4 of 10 active users
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Fig. 4. Recovery rate for 5 of 10 active users
to noisy measurements and the proof of rigorous performance
guarantees will be a topic of future research.
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